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HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAWS
IN INDIA: COMBATING TERRORISM WHILE PRESERVING CIVIL
LIBERTIES
C. RAJ KUMAR*
"Liberty is itself the gift of the law and may by the law [be]forfeited or abridged.,'
"[Tihe principle that no one shall be deprived of his life
and liberty without the
authorityof law was not the gift of the Constitution. It was a necessary [corollary] of
the concept relating to sanctity of life and liberty; it existed and was in force before
the coming intoforce of the Constitution."2
I. INTRODUCTION

The September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington D.C., 3 and the
December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament4 have intensified the debate
regarding the necessity of formulating national security laws in India and the laws'
potentially serious impact on human rights and civil liberties.5 The strengthening
of national security laws 6 worldwide is apparently pursued with the objective of
* B.Com. (Madras),LL.B. (Delhi), B.C.L. (Oxford), LL.M. (Harvard); School of Law, City University
of Hong Kong, Hong Kong. Formerly, Rhodes Scholar, University of Oxford, U.K.; Landon H.
Gammon Fellow, Harvard Law School, U.S.A.; James Souverine Gallo Memorial Scholar, Harvard
University, U.S.A.; Visiting Research Fellow, Faculty of Law, Meiji Gakuin University, Tokyo, Japan.,
Visiting Researcher, New York University School of Law, U.S.A.; Attorney and Counsellor at Law,
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, New York, U.S.A.; Consultant and Research Associate, National
Human Rights Commission, New Delhi, India. Email: crajkumar4@yaboo.com I would like to thank
the City University of Hong Kong for awarding me their Start-Up Grant and the Strategic Development
Grant, which have immensely helped me in my research. I appreciate the assistance rendered by my
research assistants, Elliot Fung, Yiyan Huang, and Vincent Wing Yin Sze, in pursuing this research. I
would like to thank Sreeram Chaulia, Michael Davis, Venkat lyer, Lin Feng, Lutz Oette, David
Sandborg, M.P. Singh, Charu Sharma, Arun Thiruvengadan and Hareed Zafrullah for their valuable
comments and suggestions to an earlier draft of this article. However, all errors remain my own.
1. Jabalpur v. Shukla, 1976 1 S.C.R. 172 (Ray, C.J.).
2. Id. (Khanna, J., dissenting).
3. For an interesting read on the impact of these acts on human rights, see Philip B. Heymann,
Civil Liberties and Human Rights in the Aftermath of September 11, 25 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 440
(2002).
4. For more information on the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, see Embassy of India,
Recent
Events,
Terrorist
Attack
on
the
Parliament
of
India,
at
http://www.indianembassy.org/new/parliamentdec_13_01 .htm (last visited May 2, 2005).
5. For a critical perspective on responses to terrorism, see Martha Crenshaw, Unintended
Consequences: How Democracies Respond to Terrorism, 21 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 153 (1997).
See also, Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment and War, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1217
(2002) (discussing past acts of terror and the United States' response to them).
6. For an excellent understanding of the Anti-terrorism laws in the U.S., see Joshua D. Zelman,
Recent Developments in InternationalLaw: Anti-TerrorismLegislation - Part One: An Overview, 11 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 183 (2001); see also Joshua D. Zelman, Recent Developments in International
Law: Anti-Terrorism Legislation- Part Two: The Impact and Consequences, II J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
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combating terrorism 7 and other forms of internal and external threats to the States
and the societies in which people live. 'In response to these developments, the
Indian government passed a new anti-terrorism law, which in this author's view,
was draconian and unnecessary. The Indian government promulgated this law
notwithstanding substantial public opinion against its passage. In fact, the National
Human Rights Commission of India (NHRC) critiqued the Prevention of
Terrorism Act of 2002 (POTA) 8 when it was still a bill. After a unanimous
decision that "there is no need for the enactment of a law based on the Draft
Prevention of Terrorism Bill [of] 2000," the NHRC recommended the bill not be
passed. 9 While the constitutional validity of POTA was upheld by the Supreme
Court of India in a later decision, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
government led by the Congress party that came to power in India in May 2004
after the elections repealed POTA by way of a Presidential Ordinance on 21
September 2004.10 However, the fact that some of the provisions of POTA came
by way of a new avatar in the amendments to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act (UAPA) has once again brought to the focus how governments tend to tinker
with human rights when responding to terrorism or in the name of preserving
national security."
Human rights and national security are at times perceived to be at odds with
one another. 12 When government officials speak about national security, their
arguments rest primarily upon the premise that protecting human rights and civil
liberties is at times subservient to protecting national security. In India, the
government has passed stringent laws protecting national security and combating
terrorist threats, but these same laws cannot pass the test of human rights scrutiny.
During the last five decades since independence, India has made significant efforts
to strengthen the legal, constitutional, and institutional framework to protect,
promote and institutionalize human rights. Since the 1980s, the Indian judiciary,
particularly the Supreme Court of India, 13 has supported these efforts through
numerous judgments limiting the powers of government-including police and
other enforcement machinery-while simultaneously expanding the notions of
POL'Y 421 (2002).
7. For an international relations perspective on terrorism, see Shashi Tharoor, September 11,
2002: Understanding and Defeating Terrorism, One Year Later, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 9
(2003).
8. For further reading on the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), see L.K. THAKUR,
ESSENTIALS OF POTA AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS (2002).

9. Id. at 257-62 (discussing NHRC's opinion on POTA while still a bill).
10. People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, 2004 9 S.C.C. 580; A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 456.
11. V.Venkatesan, POTA Reinvented, FRONTLINE,
Oct. 23, 2004, available at
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2l22/stories/2004110500481 1000.htm (last visited May 2, 2005).
12. For a very interesting perspective on drawing the balance between the combat against
terrorism while protecting human rights, see Emanuel Gross, Democracy's Struggle against Terrorism:
The Powers of Military Commanders to Decide upon the Demolition of Houses, the Imposition of
Curfews, Blockades, Encirclements and the Declarationof an Area as a closed MilitaryArea, 30 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 165 (2000).
13. For further reading on the Supreme Court of India, see SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (B.N. KIRPAL et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter
KIRPAL].
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freedom and liberty. These limitations were justified by invoking a broad and
Rights, which are enshrined in Chapter III
purposive interpretation of Fundamental
4
of the Constitution of India.1
The international human rights framework, conventions or treaties to which
India was a signatory or ratifying party, also justified the limitations on
governmental powers. However, the contemporary reality of Indian executive
governance demonstrates the weaknesses and inadequacies of the treaties and
conventions. As a result, police, military and para-military forces continue to
violate human rights. This problem underscores the need to develop a culture
amongst law enforcement officials that respects human rights as a sine qua non for
the preservation of the rule of law. Passing certain laws under the guise of
protecting national security in India offers an occasion to examine the human
rights understanding in a constitutional sense. These laws granted significant
powers to the Indian executive, thus providing greater opportunity for abuse and
violation of fundamental rights.
This article addresses the issue of Indian national security law operation and
the efforts to combat terrorism while protecting human rights as follows:
First,it provides an overview of the historical background of national security
and human rights issues in India within the context of the Constituent Assembly
debates;
Second, it explains the legal and constitutional framework of national security
legislation in India and the limitations on governmental exercise of power as
provided in the Indian Constitution. It also analyzes certain national security cases
decided by the Indian judiciary. Further, it considers how the balance between
protecting national security and promoting human rights has been achieved;
Third, it explains the legal framework of the anti-terrorism laws in India with
particular reference to the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002 (POTA) and
examines its critical implications from a human rights standpoint. It also discussed
the decision of the Supreme Court of India in upholding the constitutional validity
of POTA, while underlining the need for checks and balances in enforcing antiterrorism laws. However, the forming of a Congress-led government in India has
resulted in POTA being repealed. This is a significant positive development as far
as resistance of the human rights movement is concerned to ensure that civil
liberties are not compromised in the fight against terrorism and the need for
protecting national security. However, fears are expressed as to how strengthening
of other criminal law legislation can potentially have the same effect of POTA.
Fourth, it evaluates the human rights consequences of emergency provisions
under the Indian Constitution with the intent to examine their present status of
jurisprudence. It also critically examines certain decisions of the Supreme Court of
India which have resulted in the development of habeas corpus law.
Fifth, it examines the human rights framework and its impact on preventive
14. For an excellent reading to understand the working of the Indian constitution, see GRANVILLE
AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION - THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE (2000).
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detention laws in India;
Sixth, it provides an overview of international developments that have
attempted to balance counter-terrorist and national security interests with the
protection and promotion of human rights;
Seventh, by differentiating between national security and human security, it
provides a way forward and proposes that national security strategies should take
into consideration the relevance of human rights and development. The goal of
protecting human security will supplement the existing strategies for protecting
national security, but human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot be
compromised in the pursuit of state security policies. Rather, it is argued that the
processes of protecting human rights should result in citizen empowerment-the
foundation upon which human security will be achieved. In this regard, it is useful
to refer to the recent report of the U.N. Secretary General, In Larger Freedom:
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, in which there has been
an attempt to link some of the issues relating to security to development and
human rights. 5 But operationalization of these linkages will require a holistic
understanding of human security and its acceptances by states followed by a
paradigmatic shift in their approach toward fighting terrorism and preserving
national security. This can only result in the rhetoric of the U.N. Secretary
General's Report becoming a reality.
Eighth, the Indian experience in balancing national security concerns with
human rights commitments is examined in order to provide certain guidelines for
other countries. While most countries have already developed, or are in the process
of developing, their own national security legislation, the Indian experience is
useful to understand the importance of democratic institutions; an independent
judiciary, a free press, and a vibrant civil society to protect and promote human
rights and civil liberties from the adverse effects of draconian legislation intended
to protect citizens from real and perceived threats to national security; and
Finally, the article argues that it is natural for citizens worldwide, including
citizens in India, to feel threatened under certain "terrorized" circumstances, but
that any State or territory's response to terrorism or other national security threats
needs to be fashioned within the domestic and international human rights
framework. Understanding that the rule of law cannot be protected by the rule of
force supports this argument; hence, India and other countries of the world ought
to ensure that in their zeal to combat terrorism and to create a secure environment,
they should not pass laws, rules, and regulations that violate constitutional ideals,
political culture and other domestic and international human rights commitments.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES
During the struggle for independence, leaders of India's national freedom
movement resisted the British implementation of "national security" laws; these

15. Report of the U.N. Secretary General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security
2005,
March
York,
USA,
for
All,
New
Rights
and
Human
http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm (last visited May 2, 2005) [hereinafter Larger Freedom].
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laws were intended to create political dissent within Indian society. For example,
the British passed several "preventive detention" laws which continue to exist
today. The British defended preventive detention on grounds of extreme threats to
public order and national security, even though there were numerous cases in
which they were applied arbitrarily. 16 The government-authorized practice of
preventive detention in India had been in vogue since the passage of the East India
Company Act of 1784. This Act provided for the "detention of any person who
was suspected of participating in any correspondence or activities prejudicial or
to the peace and safety of British possessions and settlements in
dangerous
17
India."'
During British rule in India, preventive detention was authorized by the
Defence of India Acts of 1915 and 1939, the Government of India Act of 1919, the
Rowlatt Act of 1919, and the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1925.'1
These laws had provisions enabling the State to detain a person for six months
without informing the detainee of the grounds of detention. These laws were
subject to enormous abuse in the hands of colonial rulers. They provided very few
safeguards while granting discretionary powers to government officials. Because
the leaders of the freedom movement were themselves victims of these draconian
laws intended to protect "national security", they personally understood the need to
ensure that guaranteed constitutional and fundamental rights would protect
individuals from government excesses after independence. Granville Austin rightly
points out that the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles enshrined in the
Constitution of India had their deep roots in the struggle for independence and
were "included in the Constitution in the19hope and expectation that one day the
tree of true liberty would bloom in India."'
The drafters of the Constitution of India 2° intended to include a chapter on
rights within the constitutional framework from the beginning. The Constituent
Assembly members, themselves key participants in the freedom struggle, were
mindful of problems that would arise when "rights" were left to the discretion of
the government. The British were not keen on including rights during their rule,
and Dicey defended this view by arguing that enunciation of rights in a
Constitution "gives of itself but slight security that the right [had] more than a
nominal existence." 21 This argument was not appealing to the Constituent
Assembly and the members embarked on the task of drafting provisions relating to
Fundamental Rights. Assembly members understood that rights would empower
the masses of the nascent Indian democracy. The Fundamental Rights Sub16. See generally SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, GOVERNMENT
DECIDES TO PLAY JUDGE AND JURY 98 (2001) (critically examining the Prevention of Terrorism
Ordinance of 2001) [hereinafter SAHRDC].
17. Id. at 98.
18. Id. at 99.
19. GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION 50 (1966).
20. For further reading, see V.N. SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (Mahendra P. Singh ed., 10th
ed. 2001 & Supp. 2003) [hereinafter SHUKLA).
21. AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 58 n.29 (citing A.V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 207
(1961)).
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Committee (FRSC) worked on the rights chapter with a fairly high degree of
consensus, apart from a disagreement surrounding the highly contested issue as to
what extent personal liberty should be infringed in order to secure government
stability and public peace.22
The rights included in the Constitution were meant to be fundamental and
enforceable by the courts through writ jurisdiction. Nevertheless, when it came to
limiting these rights and debating their non-absoluteness, opinion was varied. The
real issue was identifying acceptable ways to limit the basic freedoms of speech,
assembly, association, and movement-the Fundamental Rights enshrined in the
Constitution. It was in this context that the Constituent Assembly had to face the
question of personal freedom versus national security.23 On March 25, 1947, the
FRSC drafted the "right to freedom" provisions of the Constitution and voted to
qualify each with the proviso that the exercise of these rights is subject to "public
order and morality." 24 As far as freedom of assembly, the Assembly attached the
restrictive proviso of the Irish Constitution. 25 The horrible communal violence that
occurred in India during the time of the debates undoubtedly had a profound
impact upon the nature and shape of the constitutional provisions. On April 14,
1947, the FRSC inserted into the 'rights-of-freedom' introduction clause a phrase
making the rights subject to suspension in emergency; for example, a threat to
national or provincial government security constituted an emergency. 2266 During the
deliberations of late 1947 and 1948, the Drafting Committee made the rights of
free speech, assembly, association, and movement subject to public order,
morality, health, decency, and public interest. In the case of free speech, an
utterance would not have to undermine the authority of the
state or be seditious or
27
slanderous in order for the emergency exception to apply.
During the debate on the Draft Constitution, speakers attacked the proviso
regarding public order and morality in response to the great momentum providing
for expanded freedom and liberty with minimal limitation.28 Granville Austin,
commenting on the situation, said: "Thakur Das Bhargava led the final assault,
moving an amendment that would put a 'soul' back in Article 13 by inserting the
word 'reasonable' before 'restrictions' in the various provisos. '29 That amendment
was a great victory for individuals who had resisted certain notions of security that
compromised liberty. The insertion of the reasonableness limitation on the Article
19 restrictions (Article 13 of the Draft Constitution) of the Constitution of India is

22. AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 63.
23. Id. at 69.
24. Id.
25. See generally id. n.78 (referring to the minutes of a March 17, 1947 meeting, at which the
Prasadpapers, File 1-F/47, were discussed). Article 40(6) (i) of the Irish Constitution allows the
prevention or control of meetings deemed a danger or a nuisance to the general public or in the vicinity
of the Parliament buildings. Id.
26. Id. at 70-71.
27. Id. at 73 n.92 (referring to Article 13 of the Draft Constitution).
28. Id. at 73.
29. Id. at 73-74.
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similar to the Due Process clause in the American Constitution. 30 This limitation
was significant as Indian judges would now have the power to judicially review
whether the restrictions were reasonable and if found to be unreasonable, could
declare them unconstitutional. The Assembly added the "reasonable" qualification
to the freedom of speech guarantee one year later when the first amendment to the
Constitution provided that the right to freedom of speech should not prevent, inter
alia, "the State from making any law, insofar as such law imposes reasonable
restrictions on the exercise of the right by the said sub-clause in the interests of the
security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states, [and] public order....'
III. THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAWS
IN INDIA

Over twelve sections, Chapter VI of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) delineates
"[offenses] against the State and the Army." These sections broadly comprise the
offenses of: (1) waging, attempting or conspiring to wage war against the
Government of India (IPC sections 121, 121A, 122, and 123); (2) assaulting the
President of India (or Governor of a State) with an intent to compel or restrain the
exercise of any lawful authority (IPC section 124); (3) waging war against a State
at peace with the Government of India (IPC sections 125); (4) permitting or aiding
the escape of a state prisoner or a prisoner of war (IPC sections 128, 129, 130); and
inciting others to rebel against the State (IPC section 124A).32 While the above
sections of the Indian Penal Code are intended to protect national security in one
form or another, there is little controversy surrounding these sections, except the
one on sedition. The word "sedition" under IPC section 124A describes an
individual's activities, whether they are words, deeds or writings, which are
intended to disturb the peace and tranquility33of the state, and to encourage others to
subvert the government established by law.
Section 124A of the IPC: Sedition - Whoever by words, either spoken or
written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts
to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection
towards the Government established by law in India, shall be punished with
imprisonment for life, to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment which
may extend to three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine.
Explanation 1 - The expression "disaffection" includes disloyalty and all
feelings of enmity.

Explanation 2 - Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of
the Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, without
exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not
constitute an offence under this section.

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 74.
Id.
K.D. GAUR, CRIMINAL LAW-CASES AND MATERIALS 635-44 (3d ed. 1999).
Id. at 635 n.1 (citing RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, THE LAW OF CRIMES 415-22 (23d ed. 1991)).
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Explanation 3 - Comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative
or other action of the Government without exciting or attempting to excite
hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this
section.34
A textual reading of the sedition section demonstrates that the law is intended
to punish the acts or attempts of a person who "brings into hatred or contempt" or
creates "disaffection" towards the Government established by law in India.
Arguably, such acts could affect national security and should be met with stringent
punishment. It is important to differentiate this kind of threat to national security
from terrorism, which is discussed later. The three explanations to section 124A
corroborate the kind of "hatred or contempt" or "disaffection" that the law is
intending to prohibit. The sedition law was subject to constitutional scrutiny under
the Constitution of India's freedom of speech and expression guarantees. Article
19 of the Constitution guarantees Indian citizens six fundamental freedoms: (1)
freedom of speech and expression; (2) freedom of assembly; (3) freedom of
association; (4) freedom of movement; (5) freedom of residence and settlement;
and (6) freedom of profession, occupation, trade, or business.35
None of these freedoms are absolute, and each is specifically restricted by
clauses two through six of Article 19, but including the word "reasonable" in
Article 19(2) has operated as a useful check to ensure that Parliament does not
impose unreasonable restrictions on citizens' freedoms. Otherwise, the judiciary
may declare those restrictions unconstitutional.36 Clauses two through six of
Article 19 enumerate the reasonable restrictions the State can impose upon
citizens' freedoms. These restrictions include: the interests of the general public,
the security of the State, public order, decency, or morality and other reasons as
listed in those sub-clauses. There could be valid justifications for including
reasonable restrictions on citizens' freedoms, because individual liberty may
occasionally have to give way to attain society's general welfare. 37 However,
because judicial independence is generally maintained in India, courts interpret the
freedom restrictions, and the restrictions' meaning and scope have been elaborated
over the years.
In order to highlight the need for balance between individual liberties and
social interests, it is useful to refer to the words of Justice Das: "[S]ocial interest in
individual liberty may well have to be subordinated to other greater social
interests.,,38 The constitutional analysis of Article 19's protected freedoms requires
39
any restriction thereof to be reasonable and designated in the Constitution.

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
at 636.
See generally SHUKLA, supra note 20.
Id.
at101.
Id.

38. Id.at100 n.10 (citing Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27).

39. Id.
at102.
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Reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech and expression can be imposed in
the interests of the security of the State. The wording "security of the state" is
subject to numerous interpretations; thus, judicial interpretation of these words is
important, lest the ambiguity can provide a source for abusing the Constitution. In
Thappar v. State of Madras,4 ° the Supreme Court of India clearly noted that
"security of state" does not refer to ordinary breaches of public order, because they
do not involve any danger to the State itself. The Constitution (First Amendment)
Act of 1951 followed this rule, as preservation of public order became one of the
grounds for imposing restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression. 4'
It needs to be noted that the word "sedition" does not appear anywhere in the
Indian Constitution, even though it is an offense against the state as specified in
the IPC. Democratic societies provide a means for the people to express their
displeasure toward a particular policy or general administration of the government
through non-violent methods. A democratic fabric in any free society, including
India, exists because of this principle. While the word "sedition" would have had a
different meaning a century ago, contemporary notions of freedom and liberty give
people enough flexibility to exercise their democratic dissent, and even
displeasure, in numerous ways. It is in this context that a law prohibiting certain
forms of speech would inevitably be subject to constitutional scrutiny. The
contemporary understanding of sedition in India includes all those practices,
whether by word, deed, or writing, that are calculated to disturb the tranquility of
the State and lead ignorant persons to subvert the government.42 Thus, the
offense's crucial elements happen to be inciting violence or creating public
disorder.
The right to freedom of speech and expression includes protection for
severely criticizing existing government structures, policies, and administrative
systems, as well as protection for suggesting and proposing the development of a
new system.43 In the landmark case Queen Empress v. Tilak,44 the Bombay High
Court held that inciting feelings of enmity against the government is sufficient for
a person to be held guilty under the sedition law. 4 However, in Niharendu v.
Emperor,46 the Federal Court interpreted section 124A more liberally and the
Chief Justice reasoned that: "[T]he acts or words complained of must either incite
disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that that is their intention or
tendency.''4 7 The court held that public disorder, or the reasonable anticipation or
likelihood thereof, was the offense's core element. The decision was progressive
because it limited the sedition offense to acts inciting violence or some other form

40. Thappur v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C.R. 594).
41. SHUKLA, supra note 20, at 114.
42. Id. at 122 n.38 (citing R. v. Sullivan, (1968) 11 Cox Cases 55)).
43. Id. at 122 n.39 (citing Niharendu v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1942 F.C.R. 22, 26).
44. GAUR, supra note 32, at 639 n.4 (citing Queen Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, I.L.R. 22
(Born.) 112).
45. Id. at 640 (referring to RATANLAL & DHIRAiLAL, THE LAW OF CRIMES 415-22 (23d ed.
1991)).

46. SHUKLA, supra note 20, at 122 n.41 (citing Niharendu,A.I.R. 1942 F.C.R. 22).
47. Id.
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of disorder and not to all forms of dissent and critical remarks made against the
Government; consequently, the Privy Council rejected this liberal interpretation.
In Emperor v. Narayan,4 s the Privy Council overruled Niharendu and held
that the expression "excite disaffection" in section 124A did not include "excite
disorder"; thus, the reasoning adopted in Niharendu was an incorrect construction
of the particular section. 49 In Singh v. State of Bihar,50 the Supreme Court of India
questioned the constitutional validity of IPC section 124A as applied to freedom of
speech and expression. After a comprehensive review of sedition jurisprudence
and the implications of sedition law on the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19
of the Constitution, the Supreme Court of India confirmed the Niharendu
interpretation of section 124A, and held that it was not ultra vires the Constitution.
The court held that:
[A]ny acts within the meaning of [section] 124A which have the effect of
subverting the Government by bringing that Government into contempt or
hatred, or creating disaffection against it, would be within the penal statute
because the feeling of disloyalty to the Government established by law or enmity
to it imports the idea or tendency
to public disorder by the use of actual violence
51
or incitement to violence.
Further, the court took note of the three explanations to section 124A and
said:
In other words, disloyalty to Government established by law is not the same
thing as commenting in strong terms upon the measures or acts of Government,
or its agencies, so as to ameliorate the condition of the people or to secure the
cancellation or alteration of those acts or measures by lawful means, that is to
say, without exciting those feelings of enmity and
disloyalty which imply
52
excitement to public disorder or the use of violence.
The court also observed that strong criticism of public measures would be
within reasonable limits and would be consistent with the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of speech and expression. 53 Thus, the court helped shape the
law on sedition in India by holding that criticism against actions of the
Government, however harsh they may be, will not invite the attention of section
124A, unless also accompanied by incitement of public disorder or violence.
IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS IN INDIA AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Clearly, terrorism is a threat to national security; thus, laws formulated to
combat terrorism would also come under the purview of protecting the security of
the State. It is a right and duty of every State to take all steps within its means to

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

GAUR, supra note 32, at 641 n.7 (citing Narayan, A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 82).
Id. at 641.
SHUKLA, supranote 20, at 122 n.44 (citing Singh, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 955).
GAUR, supra note 32, at 642.
Id.
Id. at 642-43.
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protect its people and institutions from acts of terror. Nevertheless, it is necessary
to examine what constitutes terrorism. There are many definitions of "terrorism" in
both literature and law. 54 One of them is as follows: "[T]errorism is narrowly
defined as the explicit and deliberate (as opposed to collateral) destruction or threat
of destruction of non-military, non-governmental personnel in the course of
'
political or other forms of warfare."55
Terrorism is generally directed at innocent,
56
non-combatant individuals.
In India, a number of factors have created a need for stringent national
security laws. Mr. K.P.S. Gill, Former Director General of Police of the State of
Punjab in India, has argued that: "[N]ational security legislation is not just a
definition of crimes or new patterns of criminal conduct and the prescription of
penalties. It relates to the entire system, institutional structures and processes that
are required to prevent and [penalize] such crimes, to preserve order, and secure
the sphere of governance., 57 On the urgent need for anti-terrorism laws in India,
Gill has observed that "a comprehensive set of counter-terrorism laws, as well as
laws to combat [organized] crime must be drafted and given a permanent place in
our statute books. 58 However, this argument rests on particular state perceptions
of threat, which are in turn primarily based upon law enforcement strategies, and
does not consider the causes of terrorism or related threats. It is narrow in its
approach because it focuses on only creating institutional and law enforcement
apparatuses in order to tackle terrorism and other national security concerns.
The main focus of the above argument is that: (1) the existing legal
framework is insufficient; and (2) more laws and more powers in these laws are
necessary for law enforcement officials to effectively combat terrorism and other
offenses relating to national security. It is ironic that there are consistent calls for
more laws to protect Indian national security, even though there is already a
plethora of laws in India addressing protection of national security, including
general crime prevention legislation. 59 Domestic and international human rights
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and useful interventions by the Supreme

54. For an extensive discussion of the question as to what constitutes terrorism, see Emanuel
Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The BalanceBetween the Right ofa Democracy to Defend
Itselfand the Protectionof Human Rights, 6 U.C.L.A. J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 89 (2001).
55. Alberto R. Coil, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 297, 297-98 (1987).
56. Id.
57. K.P.S. Gill, The Imperatives of National Security Legislation in India, at http://www.indiaseminar.com/2002/512/512%20k.p.s.%20gill.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2004).
58. Id.
59. Examples of existing laws relevant to national security in India as referred to by the NHRC in
its opinion are the Indian Penal Code of 1860; the Arms Act of 1959; the Explosives Act; the Explosive
Substances Act; the Armed Forces (Special) Powers Act of 1958; the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act of 1967; and the Suppression of Unlawful Activities against the Safety of Civil Aviation Act of
1982. THAKUR, supra note 8, at 258. Additionally, the Union of India enacted four at least four
Preventive Detention Acts currently in force: the National Security Act of 1980; the Prevention of
Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies Act of 1980; the Prevention of Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act of 1988; and the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of
Smuggling Activities Act of 1974. Id.
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Court of India, various High Courts, the National Human Rights Commission
(NHRC), and the State Human Rights Commissions have documented human
rights abuses committed by law enforcement officials. 60 The human rights
violations committed by the state and its institutions have been brought to the
forefront by both the judiciary and the NHRC. These violations were redressed by
compensating the victims of crime and abuse, and in certain cases, by pursuing
disciplinary actions against errant officials.
However, both the central and state governments have not attempted to
comprehensively address the abuse of power issue, notwithstanding the fact that
abuse of power by law enforcement officials is rampant. According to the NHRC's
annual reports, deaths in police custody increased from 136 in 1996 to 188 in
1997, and from 188 in 1997 to 193 in 1998.61 In 1999, the NHRC reported that 183
people died while in police custody.62 From April to August 2002, 79 people died
in police custody, while 580 died in judicial custody.63 Even the news of these
deaths has not persuaded the Indian government to pause and evaluate the need for
another draconian law meant to combat terrorism; this lack of evaluation is
particularly surprising because the new law's predecessor was notorious for its
human rights violations. 64 The Government of India attempted to introduce the
Prevention of Terrorism Bill as drafted by the Law Commission of India even after

60. Fali S. Nariman, Why I Voted against POTA, HINDU, Mar. 24, 2002, available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/03/24/stories/2002032402140800.htm (last visited May 2,
2005).
61. 1996-1997 N'TAL HUM. RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. § 3.24, available at
http://nhrc.nic.in/ar96_97.htm (last visited May 2, 2005); 1997-1998 N'TAL HUM. RIGHTS COMM'N
ANN. REP. § 3.8, available at http://nhrc.nic.in/ar97_98.htm (last visited May 2, 2005).
62. 1998-1999 N'TAL HUM. RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. § 3.17, available at
http://www.nhrc.nic.in/ar98_99.htm (last visited May 2, 2005).
63. 2000-2001

N'TAL

HUM.

RIGHTS

COMM'N

ANN.

REP.

§

4.27,

available at

http://www.nhrc.nic.in/documents/AR01-02e.pdf (last visited May 2, 2005). For the Supreme Court of
India's assessment of torture practice in India, see Justice A. S. Anand's opinion in Basu v. State of
West Bengal, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 416:
However, in spite of the constitutional and statutory provisions aimed at safeguarding the
personal liberty and life of a citizen, growing incidence of torture and deaths in police
custody had been a disturbing factor. Experience shows that [the] worst violations of
human rights take place during the course of investigation, when the police with a view to
secure evidence or confession often resorts to third degree methods including torture and
adopts techniques of screening arrest by either not recording the arrest or describing the
deprivation of liberty merely as a prolonged interrogation. A reading of the morning
newspapers, almost everyday carrying reports of dehumanising torture, assault, rape and
death in custody of police or other governmental agencies is indeed depressing. The
increasing incidence of torture and death in custody has assumed such alarming
proportions that it is affecting the creditability of the Rule of Law and the administration of
criminal justice system. The community rightly feels perturbed. Society's cry for justice
becomes louder.
Basu, 1997 1 S.C.C. 416.
64. Before the Union of India passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002 (POTA), the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of 1987 (TADA) was in force; because it was not
renewed, TADA lapsed in May 1995. Nariman, supra note 60. Out of the 74,000 persons detained
under TADA between 1984 and 1994, only 1,000 were ultimately convicted. 1d.
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the NHRC stated: "[T]here was no need for enactment of the Prevention of
Terrorism Bill [of] 2000 or similar law and that the existing laws were sufficient to
deal with any eventuality, including terrorism." 65 The NHRC further observed:
"[T]he real need is to strengthen the machinery for implementation and
enforcement of the existing laws and further for this purpose, the working of the
criminal justice system requires to be strengthened." 66 This author fully agrees
with the NHRC's opinion of POTA. New and more stringent laws cannot remedy
the weaknesses of implementing existing laws. The greater the discretion provided
law enforcement officials, the higher the chances their discretion will be abused.
Before the Indian government passed the POTA, anti-terrorism legislation
known as the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of 1987
(TADA), existed in Indian statute books.67 An evaluation of TADA demonstrates
how the Indian executive can misuse stringent anti-terrorism laws. This misuse is
the case notwithstanding the fact that India has the constitutional safeguards
necessary to protect human rights as well as an independent judiciary, an
independent and forthright media-which, in India, is by and large politically
neutral-and a vibrant civil society. The problem with TADA, like other national
security laws, is that it gave exceptional powers to law enforcement officials,
which subsequently resulted in widespread torture, arbitrary detention, and
harassment of mostly innocent citizens.68 In fact, TADA became a tool for Indian
politicians to settle political scores against people considered to be dissenters or
members of groups that practiced different political ideologies. The South Asia
Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC) has commented that: "[T]he
Government of India invoked TADA's special powers to target and [terrorize]
minorities, political opponents, union leaders, and other disempowered groups;
laws like TADA, as a consequence, undermine confidence in public security and
the rule of law. ' ' 69
SAHRDC's above critique was shared by the Supreme Court of India in one
of the most important decisions concerning TADA, where Justice Pandian warned:
"If the government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy., 70 In Kartar Singh 's
case, the Supreme Court examined TADA's provisions and its conformity with
constitutional safeguards. 7' Even though the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutional validity of the Act, it struck down some provisions and imposed
additional safeguards necessary to ensure that the fundamental rights provisions of
the Constitution were duly protected. However, the United Nations Human Rights

65. SAHRDC, supranote 16, at 13.
66. Id. at 13 n.4.
67. The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, no. 28 (India), available at
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/actandordinances/Tada.htm (last visited May
2, 2005); see also SAHRDC, supra note 16, at 13.
68. SAHRDC, supra note 16, at 31-32. For further reading, see C. Raj Kumar, State Torture in
India:Strategiesfor Resistance and Reparation,5 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 160 (2003).
69. SAHRDC, supra note 16, at 32.
70. Id. at 34 n.22 (citing Singh v State of Punjab, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 569, 719-20).
71. Id.
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Committee (UNHRC) still found the safeguards provided under TADA
72
The UNHRC
insufficient, notwithstanding the Supreme Court judgment.
welcomed the demise of TADA in 1995, while giving its final comments on
India's submission, and observed that legislation like TADA is inconsistent with
international human rights law.
The Supreme Court of India had accepted three petitions challenging the
constitutionality of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA).73 The Peoples' Union
for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and journalist and Member of Parliament, Mr. Kuldip
Nayar, jointly filed these petitions. The petitioners' main argument in this case was
that POTA lacked legislative competence and violated Articles 14, 19, 20, 21 and
22 of the Indian Constitution.74 The petitioners argued that POTA fell, in its pith
and substance, under Entry 1 of List-II (the States' List); that is, POTA falls under
"Public Order," upon which only the state governments, but not the central
government, is competent to legislate. 75 The petition also alleged that the Supreme
Court's decision in the Singh case was in error because it concluded that
Parliament was competent to enact TADA.76 The Supreme Court of India in
December 2003 upheld the constitutional validity of POTA and observed that,
"terrorism is affecting the security and sovereignty of the nation. It is not Statespecific but trans-national". 77 Discussing the competence of the law-making bodies
in India, the court while upholding this legislation held that Parliament and not the
state legislature are competent to enact such a law to counter terrorism. The court
further held that, "[i]t is a matter of policy. Once legislation is passed, the
Government has an obligation to exercise all available options to prevent terrorism
within the bounds of the Constitution. 7 8 In an editorial published in one of India's
leading national dailies, it was noted that:
While upholding the constitutional validity of the Prevention of Terrorism Act
(POTA), the Supreme Court has sanitized what is easily the most contentious
and loosely worded Section in this controversial piece of legislation. In doing
so, the Court has tempered the disappointment that might have arisen out of its
disinclination to review the provisions of this draconian law in a more
comprehensive manner. It has been clear for some time now that Section 21 of
POTA, which deals with offences relating to the support given to terrorist
organisations, is cast in a manner that virtually invites gross abuse. On a plain
reading, the Section makes no distinction between mere expressions of

72. Concluding Observations of the United Nations Human Rights Committee: India, U.N.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.81 (Aug.
4, 1997).
73. V. Venkatesan, POTA under Challenge, FRONTLINE, Feb. 1, 2003, available at
http://www.flonnet.com/fl2003/stories/20030214004102600.htm (last visited May 2, 2005).
74. Id.

75. Singh, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 569, 627-36.
76. Id. at 635.
77. Supreme Court Upholds POTA, Vaiko May Get Some Relief THE HINDU, Dec. 17, 2003,
availableat http://www.thehindu.com/2003/12/17/stories/2003121704620100.htm (last visited May 2,

2005).
78. Id.
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sympathy or verbal support for terrorist organisations and acting with the intent
of inviting support for them or their activities ....

The Supreme Court's task

was to consider the constitutionality of this extraordinary legislation and not, as
it observed, to examine whether the country really needs it. And here lies the
rub. The Court's upholding of POTA does nothing to detract from the argument
79
that-for reasons moral, political and commonsensical-POTA must go."
The court has imposed certain additional safeguards on the executive in the
enforcement of POTA and, in particular, that section 21 of POTA will be applied
only in cases where there is a criminal intention to further or encourage terrorist
activity and not mere expressions of sympathy or verbal support for terrorist
organizations. But this author has not been persuaded by the court's observations
that the Parliament had explored the possibility of employing the existing laws to
tackle terrorism and came to a decision that they were not capable of effectively
dealing with the menace. Further, the court noted that Parliament had enacted
POTA after taking all aspects into account, but there are no sufficient facts to back
up this observation.
It is interesting to note that the opinion of the National Human Rights
Commission, and indeed the wider public opinion reflected in the civil society and
in the opinions expressed by the NGOs in India, was clearly against the passing of
POTA. While the POTA passed the test of constitutional validity as the Supreme
Court of India upheld it, it could not pass the test of democratic legitimacy in a
true sense. The new government that came to power in May 2004 promulgated an
ordinance, The Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Ordinance, 2004 to repeal POTA.
However, the repeal of POTA provides only a limited degree of comfort that
draconian legislation like POTA, at the end of the day cannot exist when it has in
the first place not gathered sufficient support of the people. Positive reactions to
the repeal of POTA by the new government was seriously overshadowed by the
fact that there have been provisions in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967 Ordinance 2004 (UAPA), serving as amendments to the existing criminal law
legislation, the effect of which is to retain some of the draconian provisions of
POTA. 80 These developments once again underline the fragility of the delicate
balance that is needed in protecting human rights and preserving national security.
The fact that national security laws have come into the statute books in India in a
different guise has reinforced the need for constant vigilance against their abuse.
The courts, the human rights commissions, the media, and civil society need to be
conscious of the fact that anti-terrorism legislation has been abused by the law
enforcement machinery in India in the past. The exercise of these powers under
the UAPA should also be put under human rights scrutiny.

at
available
18,
2003,
HINDU,
Dec.
Reinterpreted,
THE
79. POTA
http://www.thehindu.com/2003/12/18/stories/2003121800901000.htm (last visited May 2, 2005).
80. Rajinder Sachar, Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) Repeal Ordinance - Myth and Reality,
in Human Rights in South Asia (specific focus India), South Asia Citizens Web (SACW), Oct. 7, 2004,
http://www.sacw.net/hrights/RSachar07102004.htmi (last visited May 2, 2005).
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OF EMERGENCY PROVISIONS UNDER THE
V. HUMAN RIGHTS CONSEQUENCES
81
INDIAN CONSTITUTION

In Chapter XVII, Articles 352 through 360,82 the Constitution of India
outlines the emergency powers vested in the Indian executive. These articles grant
specific powers under different types of emergency situations. In numerous cases,
the Supreme Court of India has discussed the impact of the Constitution's
emergency provisions on fundamental rights. In Tarsikka v. State of Punjab, the
court held that despite the issuance of a Proclamation of Emergency and
Presidential Order, a citizen could not be deprived of his right to move the
appropriate forum for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the detention was
ordered with mala fide intention.83 The question of the writ's suspension during an
Article 352 emergency period came up before the Supreme Court of India in
Jabalpur v Shukla. 4 In 1975, the President, on the Prime Minister's advice,
declared Emergency under Article 352 on the ground that internal disturbances
threatened the security of India. The President issued an order under Article 359 of
the Indian Constitution, which in turn suspended Articles 21, 22, and 14.85 Further,
86
Parliament amended the Maintenance of Internal Security Act of 1971 (MISA)
and granted the government the extraordinary power to detain a person without
trial. The legal issue was whether the writ of habeas corpus under Article 226
could be issued to release a detained person on the ground that his detention was
87
inconsistent with the provisions of MISA or was made with mala fide intention.
The Supreme Court held that the Presidential Order precluded standing for
any writ petition under Article 226 before a High Court for habeas corpus relief,
for any other writ or motion to enforce any right of personal liberty, and for any

81. For an excellent article on the issue of human rights protection in India during emergencies,
see Fali S. Nariman, Protection of Human Rights During Emergencies, INT'L COMM'N JURISTs REV.,
Dec. 1996.
82. As drafted, Article 352 enabled the President to make a declaration of grave emergency when
the security of India or any part thereof was threatened "by war or external aggression or internal
disturbance." INDIA CONSTIT. pt. XVIII, art. 352. Such declaration of emergency brought in its wake
an automatic suspension of Article 19-the rights to freedom of speech and the press, of forming
association, of movement, of property, of trade, business and profession-in Article 358. Id. pt. XVIII,
art. 358. The President was also empowered after declaring an emergency to suspend the right to move
Court for enforcement of any other Fundamental right in the Fundamental Rights Chapter. Venkatesan,
supra note 73.
83. Tarsikka v. State of Punjab, (1964) 4 S.C.R. 932, 941.
84. Shukla, (1976) 1 S.C.R. 172, 174.
85. INDIA CONSTIT. pt. XVIII, art. 359. Part III of the Indian Constitution contemplates
fundamental rights. Id. pt. III. Specifically, Article 14 contemplates equality before the law, Id. pt. III,
art. 14; Article 21 protects life and personal liberty, Id. pt. III, art. 21; and Article 22 protects against
The Indian Constitution is available at
arrest and detention, Id. pt. III, art. 22.
http://www.constitution.org/cons/lndia/pI8352.html (last visited May 2, 2005).
86. The MISA is no longer in the Indian statute books. In Mid-1977, after the Janata Party came
to power, it took more than a year to repeal MISA and delete it from the Ninth Schedule of the
Constitution of India. SAHRDC, supra note 16, at 103. However, as soon as the Congress Party came
to power in the Centre in 1980, it passed the National Security Act of 1980. Id.
87. SHUKLA, supra note 20, at 854.
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individual detained under the Act.88 The court gave constitutional legitimacy to
suspending the writ of habeas corpus during an emergency period based on
national security concerns. Singh has observed that Justice H.R. Khanna's lone
dissent brought the "rule of law" into focus as an underlying philosophy of the
Constitution, independent of Articles 21 and 359 and the judiciary's role in
upholding it.8 9 Justice Khanna's dissent took the view that even in the absence of
Article 21, the State has no power to deprive a person of his life and liberty
without the authority of law. 90 According to him, this principle is the essential
postulate and basic assumption of the rule of law. The rule of law originated from
this concept and was intended to be the standard in balancing individual liberty
and public order; in his view, the independent judiciary was supposed to ensure
this concept. 91
The Supreme Court of India's decision in the Shukla case was entirely
overruled by the Forty-fourth Amendment of the Constitution and other judicial
decisions, and is no longer the law.92 The present law on this issue is that the
enforcement of Articles 20 and 21 cannot be suspended in any situation, and the
court has further held that Article 21 binds the executive as well as the
legislature. 93 This result effectively accepts Justice Khanna's dissent in the Shukla
case, where he held that suspending enforcement of Article 21 relieves the
legislature of Article 21's constraints but not the executive-which can never
deprive a person of his life or liberty without the authority of law.94 These
developments further reinforce the argument that it is not wise to entirely trust the
legislature, executive, or even the judiciary to protect the people's rights.
Protection of human rights during emergency situations, albeit a settled issue in
India, illustrates the problems the citizenry confronts in the process of enforcing
these rights. Significantly, the Government of India has attempted to strengthen
national security legislation through "anti-terrorism" laws, even during nonemergency situations.
VI. BALANCING HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY AGAINST PREVENTIVE
DETENTION LAWS IN INDIA

Clauses four through seven of Article 22 of the Constitution of India provide
for certain safeguards in connection with the use of preventive detention laws. The
term "preventive detention" has not been defined under Indian law, but the
expression originated in the language used by English Law Lords when delineating
the nature of detention under Regulation 14-B, the [Defense] of Realm Act of

88. SAHRDC, supranote 16, at 103.
89. SHUKLA, supra note 20, at 854.
90. Gopal Subramanium, Emergency Powers under the Indian Constitution, in KIRPAL, supra
note 13, at 134, 141-42.
91. Id.
92. SHUKLA, supra note 20, at 855.
93. Id.
94. Shukla, (1976) 1 S.C.R. 172, 246; see also SHUKLA, supra note 20, at 855; Gandhi v. Union of
India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621.
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1914, which was passed after the First World War. 9 5 To quote Lord Finlay in The
King v. Halliday: "The measure is not punitive[,] but precautionary." 96 The
objective of such laws is to take precautions so that suspected persons will not
commit an offense. Obviously, the executive determines: (1) the justification for
the detention; (2) the circumstances under which the suspicion arises; and (3) the
reasonable and probable causes of the impending act. The Constitution legalized
preventive detention because the Constitution's framers had foreseen that "there
may arise occasions in the life of the nation when the need to prevent citizens from
the bases of an established
acting in ways which unlawfully subvert or disrupt
97
order may outweigh the claims of personal liberty."
However, codifying preventive detention laws within the Constitution has
continuously raised serious human rights dilemmas. Preventive detention was
always justified on grounds of national security. The Constituent Assembly of
India formulated provisions to allow for passage of preventive detention laws as an
integral part of the Constitution.98 Entry 9 of List I and Entry 3 of List III, in
conjunction with Article 246, conferred this power on Parliament and State
Legislatures. Deemed a necessary evil, the basic purpose in conferring the power
to pass such legislation was to protect the country's national security. However,
this power conferral was more than a half-century ago and significant
developments which seriously question the legal and human rights validity of these
provisions have occurred in international human rights law. The Indian legislature
included preventive detention provisions in all acts intended to protect national
security. Besides the National Security Act of 1980 (NSA), 99 the other central
legislations providing for preventive detention are: (1) the Conservation of Foreign
Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act of 1974;I ° ° (2) the
Prevention of Black-Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential
Commodities Act of 1980;1° 1(3) the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances Act of 1988;102 and (4) the Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act of 1987, which lapsed in May 1995.103

95. SHUKLA, supra note 20, at 186.
96. 1917 A.C. 260, 269 (Finlay, L.C.). Hallidaywas appealed from the King's Bench, I K.B. 738
(1916), to the Court of Appeal, Civil Division.
97. Rajbhar v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 3 S.C.R. 63, 70; see also SHUKLA, supra note 20, at
187 n.32.
98. SAHRDC, supra note 16, at 100.
99. The National Security Act, 1980, no. 65 (India), available at http://164.100.10.12/cgi/nphbwcgi/BASIS/indweb/all/secretr/SDW?M=l &W=actid='198065' (last visited May 2, 2005).
100. The Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, no.
52 (India), available at http://www.geocities.com/indiancustoms/act/cofeposa.htm (last visited May 2,
2005).
101. The Prevention of Black-Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities
Act,1980, no. 7 (India), availableat http://ahara.kar.nic.in/blackecact.htm (last visited May 2, 2005).
102. The Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988, no.
46 (India), available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/legal-library/in/legal-library-1989-1020_1989-9.html (last visited May 2, 2005).
103. The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, no. 28 (India) available at
(last visited May
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/actandordinances/Tada.htm
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The legislature enacted NSA to prevent individuals from acting against the
interests of the state, including acts that threaten the "security of India," or the
"security of the State Government," or are "prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order." 1°4 The NSA has minimal procedural safeguards and it allows the
government to detain any individual if the State thinks the detention will prevent
i05
the person from committing acts prejudicial to the order and security of India.
The law allows detention of individuals in order to prevent acts threatening "public
order" and "national security." However, neither the Constitution nor the NSA
defines these words, and there is zero guidance as to what actions would constitute
a threat to public order or national security in any given case. 10 6 In Lohia v State of
Bihar, the Supreme Court tried to distinguish between the concepts "security of
State," "public order," and "law and order."' 0 7 Justice Hidayathullah held that only
the most severe acts would warrant use of preventive detention:
One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the
largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the
smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may

affect law and order but not0 public
order just as an act may affect public order
8
but not security of the State.1

Roy v. Union of India challenged the NSA's constitutionality, but the
Supreme Court held that the Act did not violate the Constitution.' °9 Nonetheless,
the court insisted that the extraordinary power of preventive detention be narrowly
construed." 0 These cases clearly demonstrate the fact that although Indian courts
are unwilling to declare preventive detention laws unconstitutional, they are
attempting to ensure that appropriate restrictions are imposed on the use of such
laws. Arguably, "preventive'detention" as defined in these laws is "inconsistent
with well-settled international human rights standards.""' The Preamble to the
Constitution of India manifests the framers' basic objective of building a new
socio-economic order where every person is guaranteed social, economic and
political justice, equality of status, and opportunity. 112 This basic objective

2, 2005); see also Nariman, supranote 60.

104. The National
Security
Act, 1980,
no. 65,
§ 3 (India), available at
http://164.100.10.12/cgilnph-bwcgi/BASIS/indweb/all/secretr/SDW?M=I&W=actid='I98065'
(last
visited May 2, 2005).
105. SAHRDC, supra note 16, at 103-04.
106. Derek P. Jinks, The Anatomy of an InstitutionalisedEmergency: Preventive Detention and
PersonalLiberty in India, 22 MICH. J. OF INT'L L. 311, 330 (2001).
107. Lohia v. State of Bihar, (1966) 1 S.C.R. 709.
108. Id. at 746.
109. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 272.
110. Id. at 275.
111. SAHRDC, supra note 16, at 100.
112. Specifically, the Preamble reads:
We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign socialist secular
democratic republic and to secure to all its citizens: Justice, social economic and political; Liberty of
thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; Equality of status and of opportunity; and to promote
among them all Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the
Nation; In Our Constituent Assembly, this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do Hereby Adopt,
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mandates that every State institution, including the Executive, Legislature and
Judiciary, work together harmoniously in order to realize the objectives3enshrined
in the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy."
The judiciary played a central role in strengthening the human rights
framework by interpreting constitutional provisions. The Constitution assigns the
task of enforcing Fundamental Rights to the Supreme and High Courts; the right to
move the Supreme Court for enforcement of Fundamental Rights has been
elevated to the status of a Fundamental Right under Article 32 of the
Constitution.11 4 From 1979 to 1980, local authorities in Bhagalpur, an Indian town
in the Bihar state, blinded thirty-three detainees in order to coerce their
confessions.1 5 A newspaper journalist wrote a commentary exposing this incident,
and a lawyer sent the article to the Supreme Court of India. Justice P.N. Bhagwati,
who received the article, treated it as a petition by the sender, 1 6 and the Supreme
Court obtained what later came to be known as "epistolary jurisdiction"'" 7 over
this case. The attorney-petitioner sought to enforce the due process guarantees of
the Constitution of India. 18 Remarkably, over the course of the next few years, the
Supreme Court of India ordered the State of Bihar to provide medical treatment for
the detainees and pensions for the detainees' families; in subsequent hearings, the
court monitored the victims' rehabilitation.' 9 This highly innovative grant of
Enact and Give to Ourselves this Constitution.
INDIA CONSTIT. pmbl. See also SHUKLA, supranote 20.
113. N.R. Madhava Menon, Public Interest Litigation: A Major Breakthrough in the Delivery of
Social Justice, 9 J. BAR COUNCIL INDIA 150 (1982).
114. Chief Justice A.S. Anand, Public Interest Litigation as Aid to Protection of Human Rights,
M.C. Bhandari Memorial Lecture (2001), in (2001) 7 S.C.C. (Jour) 1, available at http://www.ebcindia.comlawyer/articles/2001 v7al .htm (last visited May 2, 2005).
115. AMNESTY INT'L, INDIA: TORTURE, RAPE AND DEATHS IN CUSTODY 50 (1992).
116. Khatri v. State of Bihar, (1981) 1 S.C.C. 623 ("KhatriP'). Khatrilandits companion cases,
Khatri v. State of Bihar, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 408 ("Khatri I/"), and Khatri v. State of Bihar, (1981) 1 S.C.C.
635 ("Khatri 1/1"), are collectively known as the BhagalpurBlinding Cases.
117. See generally UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002) ("decipher[ing] the
future of social action assembled, by convention, under a portal named human rights .. .[and] ...
problematic[ing] the very notion of human rights, the standard narratives of their origin, the ensemble
of ideologies animating their modes of production, and the wayward circumstances of their
enunciation"). Epistolary jurisdiction is a procedure by "which judges [take] the initiative to respond
proactively to grievances brought to their attention by third parties, letters, or newspaper accounts."
Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, "Breadfor the Poor": Access to Justice and the Rights of the
Needy in India,55 HASTINGS L.J. 789, 795 (2004).
118. The guarantees are found in: (1) Article 14 of the Indian Constitution: "Equality before law. The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within
the territory of India," INDIA CONSTIT. pt. II1, art. 14; and (2) Article 21: "Protection of life and
personal liberty. - "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law," Id. pt. III, art. 21. The basis for jurisdiction was Article 32(1): "The
right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred
by this Part is guaranteed." Id. pt. Ill, art. 32(1). The Supreme Court's power is broad; for example,
Article 32(2) reads: "The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition quo warranto and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part." Id. pt.
III, art. 32(2).
119. Khatri I,(1981) 1 S.C.C. 623; Khatri 11, (1981) 2 S.C.R.408; KhatriIII, (1981) 1 S.C.C. 635;
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bystander standing 120 in the Bhagalpur Blinding case occurred in the same year
of the standing doctrine
that several bar associations successfully sought12expansion
1
in the highly politicized Judges' Transfer case.
VII. PRESERVING NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS WHILE
PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS - INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Several countries face the problem of balancing the two seemingly competing
interests of preserving national security and protecting human rights. At the United
Nations and international human rights NGOs, there are serious global efforts to
articulate the human rights concerns underlying states' processes in formulating
national security policies. The U.N. Secretary General submitted a report entitled
ProtectingHuman Rights and FundamentalFreedoms while CounteringTerrorism
to the Commission on Human Rights during its fifty-ninth session pursuant to the
December 18, 2002 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 57/219.122 Resolution
57/219 emphatically asserted the importance of protecting human rights, even
while pursuing all efforts to counter terrorism in order to preserve national
security. The resolution affirmed that: "States must ensure that any measure taken
to combat terrorism complies with their obligations under international law, in
particular international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law .... 123
During the sixty-second meeting of the Commission on Human Rights on
April 25, 2003, it adopted resolution 2003/68, which reiterated that the elimination
of the practice and threat of terrorism should go hand-in-hand with the protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 124 Human Rights Watch, the New
York-based NGO, submitted a well-argued briefing paper on this subject for the
fifty-ninth session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. 125 The paper
commented that it was important for national and international counter-terrorism
initiatives to be within the human rights framework and observed: "Protecting
human rights during counter-terrorist efforts is more than a legal requirement. It is
integral to the success of the campaign against terrorism itself. Terrorism will not
be defeated solely by military or security means... Combating terrorism requires a
reaffirmation of human rights values, not their rejection., 26 The paper also noted

Khatri v. State of Bihar, (1981) 2 S.C.C. 493 ("KhatriIV').
120. For a comprehensive discussion of standing and bystander standing, see William A. Fletcher,
The Structure ofStanding, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988).
121. Gupta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149 (popularly known as the Judges' Transfer
case).

122. ProtectingHuman Rights and FundamentalFreedoms while Countering Terrorism:Report of
the Secretary-Generalon Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 57/219, U.N. ESCOR, 59th
Sess., Agenda Item 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/120 (2003).
123. Id. 2.
124. Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism:
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2003/68, U.N. ESCOR, 62nd mtg., U.N. Doc.

EICN.4/2003/RES/2003/68 (2003). This resolution was adopted without a vote. Id.
125. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
WORLDWIDE (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-bck.pdf (last visited
May 2, 2005).
126. Id. at 3.
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the U.N. Secretary General's remarks during a debate of the Security Council's
Counter Terrorism Committee in October 2002 when he observed: "[T]o pursue
security at the expense of human
rights is short-sighted, self-contradictory, and, in
27
the long run, self-defeating.'
The numerous institutional mechanisms in the U.N. system have all
recognized the possible human rights violations that can occur as a result of state
efforts to combat terrorism. In fact, even before September 11, 2001, the UNHRC
formulated parameters upon which states responding to a national security threat
28
could justifiably derogate from their legal commitment to protect human rights.
In this regard, the UNHRC observed that, even in armed conflicts, states must
show that the situation threatens the life of the nation and that the measures
derogating from the international covenants are necessary, legitimate, and "limited
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation."' 129 The
proportionality requirement, in the UNHRC's opinion, "relates to the duration,
geographical coverage and
materials scope of the state emergency and any
130
measures of derogation.'
In its November 2001 statement, the Committee against Torture (CAT)
reminded state parties that most of their legal obligations were non-derogable, and
asked the States to ensure that their counter-terrorism responses conformed to the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.' 31 The Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
also adopted a statement on racial discrimination and measures to combat
terrorism.13 2 The CERD postulated that counter-terrorism measures should be in
accordance with international human rights and humanitarian law; further, the
prohibition of racial discrimination was a peremptory norm from which no
derogation was allowed. 133 Thus, the policy formulation and statement adoption by
U.N. human rights mechanisms and the efforts of human rights NGOs undertaken
both before and after September 11, 2001 demonstrate the need for a balance
between the interest in protecting a state's national security from terrorist threats
and the importance in protecting an individual's human rights and civil liberties.
VIII. THE

WAY FORWARD - TRANSITION FROM PROTECTING NATIONAL SECURITY

TO PROMOTING HUMAN SECURITY

The State must be protected from both national and international threats.
National security strategies are increasingly designed with the belief that passing
stringent laws that grant the executive, including law enforcement authorities,
punishment and greater discretionary powers will help thwart terrorists and other

127. Id.
128. Id. at 5-6.
129. Human Rights Committee, States of Emergency (article 4): CCPR General Comment 29.
(General Comments), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.l 1,31/0812001, 4.
130. Id.
131. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 125, at 6.
132. Statement on Racial Discriminationand Measures to Combat Terrorism, U.N. Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 61 st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/57/18 (Chapter XI)(C) (2002).
133. Id. 3-4.
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internal and external threats. India has passed anti-terrorism laws with the intention
of preserving the security of the State from its own people and external threats. It
is ironic that the Constitution of India, which is similar to many other countries'
constitutions, along with the Bill of Rights provisions in several other constitutions
and other national and international human rights laws, were intended to protect
the citizens from the State. However, the contemporary worldwide efforts that
focus on protecting the State from its citizens are indeed a significant
development, especially when these developments affect peoples' human rights
and civil liberties.
There is little controversy regarding the need for States to pass laws
protecting national security, and it is accepted that doing so is a legitimate and
important public policy and governance mechanism vested in the State.
Nevertheless, states should be careful to ensure that these laws are not abused or
ineffectively implemented, as in India. The abuse of national security laws and
their resulting ineffectiveness threatens the rule of law and attacks the polity's
democratic foundation upon which the State exists. It is in this context that States
facing national and international terrorist threats and other problems must seriously
examine their entire government system, particularly the impact of its domestic
and foreign policies on its own people and people of other states. This
consideration has recently implicated a broader notion of human security.
In its Final Report, the Commission on Human Security (CHS) observed that
human security supplements state security while enhancing human rights and
strengthening human development. 134 The purpose of human security is to protect
people against a broad range of individual and community threats. It also
empowers the citizenry to act for themselves. 135 The goal is to bring the human
security elements to the forefront while moving state security, which is based on
laws protecting national security, toward an expansion of rights and development
of social and economic policies promoting human security.1 36 The CHS defines
human security as:
[Aiming] to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human
freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental
freedoms-freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from
critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means
using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means
creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems
that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and
13 7

dignity.

134. COMMISSION ON HUMAN SECURITY, HUMAN SECURITY Now 2-17 (2003), available at
http://www humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/chapterl .pdf (last visited May 2, 2005).
135. Id.
136. See Sadako Ogata, From State Security to Human Security, Brown University Ogden Lecture
(May 16, 2002), available at http://www'humansecurity-chs'org/activities/outreach/ogata-ogden.pdf
(last visited May 2, 2005).
137. COMMISSION ON HUMAN SECURITY, supranote 134, at 4.
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The CHS's definition of human security is useful to comprehend the need to
shift the paradigm towards promotion of security in order to empower people and
protect them from all threats. Thus, under the human security paradigm, the
national security needs of a State will not be based solely on conventional notions
of internal and external sources of terrorist threats. It is necessary to understand
that preserving peace, stability, and order in an increasingly inter-dependent world
has to be based upon states recognizing that both national and international
government processes need to be based upon upholding human rights. 138 The
national security policy, whether by state legislation, rule, regulation, or policy,
needs to be accompanied by an inclusive and equitable set of development policies
that foster greater
understanding of, and respect for, the dignity and equality of the
39
people.1
world's
The U.N. Secretary General had recently submitted a report to the U.N.
General Assembly entitled: In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security
and Human Rightsfor All, in which he has emphasized the need for understanding
security from a holistic perspective and most importantly to appreciate freedom
from human rights and development perspectives. He has argued that: "Not only
are development, security and human rights all imperative; they also reinforce each
other. This relationship has only been strengthened in our era of rapid
technological advances, increasing economic interdependence, globalization and
dramatic geopolitical change". Discussing the relationship of terrorism to other
problems that affect humanity, he has observed that, "While poverty and denial of
human rights may not be said to "cause" civil war, terrorism or organized crime,
they all greatly increase the risk of instability and violence. Similarly, war and
atrocities are far from the only reasons that countries are trapped in poverty, but
they undoubtedly set back development. Again, catastrophic terrorism on one side
of the globe, for example an attack against a major financial centre in a rich
country, could affect the development prospects of millions on the other by
causing a major economic downturn and plunging millions into poverty. And
countries which are well governed and respect the human rights of their citizens
are better placed0 to avoid the horrors of conflict and to overcome obstacles to
14
development.'
The report further underlines that, "Accordingly, we will not enjoy
development without security, we will not enjoy security without development,
and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless all these
causes are advanced, none will succeed. In this new millennium, the work of the
United Nations must move our world closer to the day when all people have the
freedom to choose the kind of lives they would like to live, the access to the
resources that would make those choices meaningful and the security to ensure that

138. Id. at 5.
139. See e.g., C. Raj Kumar, War on Terror a Threat to Academic Freedom, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Nov. 22, 2002, at 16 (arguing that because greater understanding can be achieved through
academic discourse, attempts to thwart such discourse under the pretext of pursuing terrorists or
protecting national security should not be trusted).
140. Larger Freedom, supra note 15.
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they can be enjoyed in peace".' 4' The report is indeed a positive development in
providing a thematic framework for understanding security in a much wider
context. However, it is not clear how the report can provide a meaningful
challenge to the existing discourse on the "war on terror", which seems to
undermine human rights and, at times, international law for achieving certain
national security objectives. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the earlier
observations of the U.N. Secretary General, Mr. Kofi Arman, that the Iraq war is
"illegal" and is not in conformity with the U.N. Charter. This has raised some very
important questions relating to the future of international law and the United
Nations. Even though Mr. Kofi Annan has been critical of the Iraq war from the
very beginning, the fact that he chose to call it "illegal" is truly significant. 42 This
only reinforces the view held by many independent international lawyers and nongovernmental organisations that the Iraq war violated the U.N. Charter. It may be
remembered that even before the illegal intervention that took place in Iraq, the
global public opinion was against the war in Iraq. The protests were very strong
even in countries like the United States and United Kingdom, which were key
proponents of the war. The transnational civil society, in the form of human rights
NGOs in different parts of the world, had made representations to the governments
in the United States and the United Kingdom not to go ahead with the war.
Human rights in all its ramifications have acquired social and political
legitimacy in the contemporary world. While nations have made efforts to protect
and promote human rights, there have been numerous challenges that confront the
enforcement of human rights. Terrorism is probably the greatest danger to human
rights one can think of, but unwise reactions and responses to it can itself lead to
human rights violations. Mahatma Gandhi said, "Any eye for an eye only end up
making the whole world blind.' 43 Terrorism violates human rights and attacks the
peace and stability of nations and its people. Responses to terrorism and possible
human rights violations that occur due to the implementation of anti-terrorism laws
demonstrate the perpetual conflict between public protection (national security)
and individual rights. What should be done when enforcement of human rights
appear to clash with the enforcement of national security measures is the key issue
facing the post-September 11 world. There is a need for states recognizing that
international law and domestic constitutional law are necessary to ensure that the
fight against terrorism does not violate human rights so that national security can
be achieved without violating civil liberties. There is a delicate balance between
ensuring national security and protecting human rights, which should be preserved.
IX. THE

INDIAN EXPERIENCE IN PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS

The debates regarding the necessity of strengthening national security
legislation and formulating laws relating to anti-terrorism is of contemporary
significance in many parts of the world. There are some important Indian lessons
141. Id.
142. Iraq War Illegal, Says Annan, BBC News UK Edition, Sept. 16, 2004, available at
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that would help other countries currently in the process of passing anti-terrorism
laws. It may be useful to bear in mind the Indian experience while structuring the
debates concerning national security legislation. The Indian government was
successful in passing anti-terrorism legislation, and the statute books still list
traditional offenses, like sedition and treason, relating to national security.
However, the laws relating to traditional national security matters have been
thoroughly interpreted. The anti-terrorism laws have taken more prominence in
India because they applied to national security offenses. There are four important
factors to serve as checks and balances in the potential abuse of anti-terrorism
laws. However, the effectiveness of these checks and balances has been seriously
questioned recently.
A. Human Rights Protectedunder the Constitution& Other Legislation.
The Indian Constitutional framework, as examined earlier, protects the
people's rights and guarantees constitutional remedies for fundamental rights
violations. In other jurisdictions, it would be useful to have a similar constitutional
or human rights framework as the basis for ensuring that the people's rights are
protected. Further, any national security legislation or other anti-terrorism
legislation ultimately passed must satisfy constitutional and human rights scrutiny
under the country's respective laws. These laws should also be consonant with the
particular nation's international human rights law and treaty obligations.
B. Role of the Judiciary in Protectingand PromotingHuman Rights.
The Indian judiciary has been an independent and vibrant forum for human
rights discourse in Indian society. While the enforcement of human rights and the
effectiveness of judicial institutions in India are far from perfect, the courts'particularly the Supreme Court of India and various state High Courts- scrutiny
of human rights under the Indian Constitution has been fairly effective. That is,
the executive must ensure that the particular national security legislation and its
enforcement mechanisms are constitutionally valid. This requirement has always
been an important check on executive power; instead of possibly abusing the laws,
the executive must ensure that the laws satisfy constitutional protection of human
rights, as well as the human rights guarantees developed by Indian courts'
jurisprudence. The judiciary in various nations must play a similar role in
questioning the constitutional validity of the proposed national security legislation
and ensuring that law enforcement does not result in any violations of
constitutional rights or ICCPR obligations. These very valuable mechanisms place
useful checks on the exercise of executive power with regard to national security
and various offenses thereof.
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C. Role of the National Human Rights Commission in Protecting Civil
Liberties.'"
The Protection of Human Rights Act of 1993 established India's National
Human Rights Commission (NHRC). The NHRC is empowered to receive
complaints broadly relating to any human rights violations. 145 Over the years, the
NHRC has developed a good reputation both nationally and internationally with
regard to intervention on human rights matters. NHRC's opinions on numerous
matters are inconsistent with the Indian government's position. The NHRC also
engages state governments on various human rights and law reform matters, the
most important of which is ensuring that legislation conforms to the human rights
obligations in the Indian Constitution and other laws. The NHRC's moral
legitimacy is based on its members' impartiality and integrity, and not on its
institutional independence or its guaranteed powers in the Protection of Human
Rights Act of 1993.
While it is difficult to evaluate whether the NHRC has successfully reduced
human rights violations, it has certainly attempted to develop a human rights
culture in India. In addition, there have been serious attempts to create
accountability mechanisms for human rights violations in different levels of the
Indian government to help ensure that human rights remain the central focus of
Indian political and government discourse. The NHRC remains a forum in which
people can seek justice for human rights violations. The United Nations has
encouraged the formation of national human rights institutions worldwide to
promote institutionalization of human rights. However, it is important to recognize
that the NHRCs should function in an independent and autonomous manner for
them to be truly effective institutions in the protection and promotion of human
rights.
X. CONCLUSION

Before and after September 11, 2001, national security and counter-terrorism
concerns drove, and are still driving, nation states to introduce draconian laws and
amendments curtailing or restricting citizens' fundamental rights in democracies.
India, which has been afflicted with secessionist violence and terrorism in several
of its states, passed POTA. This article defends the Indian NHRC's position that
POTA was unnecessary. It proposes that the problem with anti-terrorist laws in
India is not that they are lacking or less in number, but rather, that they are
ineffectively implemented. Most forms of terrorist threats in India are effectively
contemplated by already existing laws. Yet, just as in the case of the U.S. Patriot
Acts,146 the Indian executive and Parliament enacted POTA without adequately
144. For a critical perspective on NHRCs, see C. Raj Kumar, National Human Rights Institutions:
Good Governance Perspectives on Institutionalization of Human Rights, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 259

(2003).
145. For further reading, see C. Raj Kumar, Role and Contribution of National Human Rights
Commissions in Promoting National and International Human Rights Norms in the National Context,
47 IND. J. PuB. ADMIN. 222 (2001).
146. For further reading on the Patriot Act, see Shirin Sinnar, Patriotic or Unconstitutional? The
Mandatory Detention ofAliens Under The USA Patriot Act, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1419 (2003).
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assessing its necessity and potential impact on constitutional safeguards and other
international human rights standards. Later developments, like the Supreme Court
of India upholding the constitutional validity of POTA, while providing certain
checks and balances in the enforcement of POTA and the new UPA government
that came to power in India in May 2004 repealing POTA, have not changed the
context of the debate. In fact the need for protecting human rights while preserving
national security needs to be underlined as the government of India has
unfortunately passed an ordinance amending certain provisions of an existing
criminal legislation in the form of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA).
Some of the provisions of this legislation are as draconian as the provisions of the
POTA and hence, the human rights resistance in India needs to continue. This
article gives a broad historical overview of the Indian legislation limiting human
rights and highlights problematic aspects.
A balance between countering terrorism and promoting human rights is
attainable as long as the "reasonable" constitutional provision is developed and
Indian law evolves in conjunction with the efforts of the inter-governmental and
non-governmental organizations in protecting civil liberties while combating
terrorism. 147 The best human rights defense regarding national security laws is the
prevention of abuse and erosion by improper and unwarranted government action.
The test of any historical theory is its capability to interpret past events in ways
that illuminate the present and help us see the path ahead. For example, in India,
the executive abused both TADA and POTA, which were in many ways the
UAPA's earlier equivalents. The voices that cry for vengeance urge us to renounce
our commitments to protect human rights at all times, including the times when we
are beset with terrorism and national insecurity of the gravest kind. It is during
these challenging times that we need to rise to the occasion and not forget the past.
We need to underline the fact that through valuing human rights and
promoting civil liberties, deliberative democracies like India and other countries
create a place for meaningful dialogue, debate, and dissent within civil and
political society. Terrorism defies all established norms of dignity, decency, and
decorum-mandatory for peaceful existence in any society. As a society, we must
condemn terrorism of all kinds and should never accept it as a method of achieving
any goals, however noble they may be. At the same time, as Benjamin Cardozo
said: "We are what we believe we are"; 148 thus, we should be careful to fashion our
response to terrorism-after all, posterity will judge our responses. We must take
care not to deviate from the universal values of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in our zeal to preserve national security.

147. See C. Raj Kumar, War on Terror Must Start with Respect for Human Rights, S. CHINA
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